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Abstract—Efficient key management for automotive networks
(CAN) is a critical element, governing the adoption of security
in the next generation of vehicles. A recent promising approach
for dynamic key agreement between groups of nodes, Plug-
and-Secure for CAN, has been demonstrated to be information
theoretically secure based on the physical properties of the CAN
bus. In this paper, we illustrate side-channel attacks, leading to
nearly-complete leakage of the secret key bits, by an adversary
that is capable of probing the CAN bus. We identify the
fundamental characteristics that lead to such attacks and propose
techniques to minimize the information leakage at the hardware,
controller and system levels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, an increase in the number of
connectivity interfaces on a traditional automobile has drawn
the attention of the security community. Several high profile
attacks have been demonstrated on the modern car by aca-
demic and industrial researchers, e.g. [1]–[5]. These attacks
are primarily facilitated by the lack of security (authentication,
encryption) in the existing architecture of the controller area
network (CAN). Concurrently, several techniques have been
proposed for integrating security into the current architecture,
[6]–[9].
Similar to traditional secure systems, several of these tech-
niques rely on secure provisioning of symmetric keys within
the nodes on the CAN bus. However, secure and robust provi-
sioning, maintenance and update of cryptographic keys within
the automotive supply chain can be incur significant overhead,
and may require changes to the automotive manufacturing and
servicing facilities. Several commercial systems to enable such
a process have been proposed, e.g. in [10].
Dynamic generation and distribution of keys in a secure
manner can provide an alternative (or reduce the functional
requirements) of traditional provisioning systems. One promis-
ing approach, Plug-and-Secure for CAN (PnS-CAN), has been
recently proposed towards this goal, in [11], [12]. A key
advantage of the Plug-and-Secure scheme is the utilization of
inherent physical layer properties of the CAN bus to provide
security guarantees for key agreement between groups of
nodes.
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Cryptographic systems that are provably secure in the
computational model have often been compromised by exploit-
ing characteristics of their physical implementation. Physical
characteristics such as timing differences, power leakage, and
other features or radiation can provide a covert communication
medium, side-channels, leaking system information to an ad-
versary. Several attacks have been demonstrated on traditional
systems using side channels, e.g. in [13]–[16]. Comprehensive
analysis of a system to identify and exploit such side-channels
can be difficult. It has been observed from traditional systems
that prevention of such attacks can add significant overhead to
system design and negatively impact performance.
In this paper, we demonstrate that other properties of
physical layer the CAN bus can be utilized to violate the
security of the PnS-CAN system by an adversary capable of
probing the CAN bus. Here we discuss several voltage, timing
and transient characteristics based side-channels that can be
used to attack the system and partially extract the secret keys.
We then propose countermeasures that can be implemented
at different levels of the system, namely low level hardware
changes, controller modifications and system level changes.
Our methods align well with existing system configuration
and result in little overhead.
A. Our Contributions
We investigate the side-channels for the two-party PnS-CAN
protocol proposed in [11]. Our contributions are as follows,
• We identify characteristics of the CAN bus that can be
utilized to extract the secret key during execution of the
PnS-CAN protocol. We outline a general methodology
to map existing CAN identification techniques to attack
our scheme. We further demonstrate the attack of the
system due to one of the non-trivial feature, i.e. timing
characteristics.
• We propose countermeasures that can be included in the
transceiver hardware or the CAN controller to minimize
such leakage.
• For key agreement between groups using the PnS-CAN
protocol, we propose system level changes that can be
used to further reduce the side-channel leakage.
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B. Related Work
Side-channels: Since the initial results of Kocher [13], a
lineage of work has been created to utilize the state based
differences in a physically observable phenomenon, such as
timing, power, etc, to estimate the secret state. Several attacks
have been demonstrated on traditional systems using timing
characteristics [13], [17], power characteristics [14], and a
variety of other side-channels [15], [16]. Our results extend
this line of work and utilize the differences in the physical
characteristics between various participating nodes to extract
the secret key. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work
in literature to identify low-level attacks on the PnS-CAN
scheme.
A critical difference of our work from existing side-channel
literature is that traditionally, side-channel attacks extract a
pre-existing secret key based on usage of the key. In our
work however, we extract the secret key during its derivation
phase, i.e. prior to storage. Thus, existing methods can be
applied in conjunction with our work to extract any secret
bits that remain.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) based on CAN signal
characteristics: The lack of node-identity and authentication
in the traditional CAN protocol has led several researchers to
utilize physical signal (or device) characteristics as a finger-
print to identify the transmitting nodes. These results, e.g. in
[18]–[20], highlight the existence of subtle, yet identifiable
differences between the transmissions from different nodes
on the CAN bus. Though such features have been explored
and utilized to obtain very robust identification features in
traditional network domains, i.e. wireless networks, Ethernet
based networks or aquatic networks, they are in very early
stages of investigation for CAN.
Since the PnS-CAN system relies on the inability of an
adversary to identify the transmitter, any fingerprint associated
with the transmitter of a node can be used to attack PnS-
CAN. It should be noted that these results were investigated
in context of increasing system security by designing an IDS
based on the identified features. However, in our case, these
features are utilized to attack the system.
The authors in [19] use simple features such as mean-
square error between bit samples, and convolution amplitude to
fingerprint and identify the ECUs. However, the performance
of these mechanisms is highly dependent on the message
value, which can vary significantly for our schemes. This was
improved in [18] by using several time domain and frequency
domain features of the transmitted signals. The authors in [20]
further improve the results and utilize a variety of classifiers,
ranging from simple binary support vector machines (SVM) to
multi-layered convolutional neural network (CNN) to identify
the ECUs. They demonstrate that despite using low precision
hardware for sensing, they can achieve improvement over tra-
ditional classifiers by utilizing powerful methods such as CNN.
Intuitively, these identification mechanisms can be utilized to
break the PnS system. There are however several challenges
and simplifications that additionally apply to the PnS system.
For example, these systems rely on classification of a message
frame consisting of a single transmitter and synchronization
source. However, for the PnS-CAN system, this assumption
does not apply directly. On the other hand, simpler features
may be used due to a slightly different structure of the
problem.
C. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the basic PnS-CAN system and the ad-
versarial model. We provide an overview of the useful physical
characteristics in Section III, and demonstrate an attack on an
unprotected system. We propose several countermeasures to
prevent these attacks in Section IV. In Section V, we discuss
the practical applicability of our countermeasures and future
directions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We adhere to the following notation for the paper. For two
nodes nodeN1, nodeN2 executing the protocol, we denote by
x − y, the simultaneous transmission of x by the primary
node, i.e. nodeN1 and y by nodeN2. Here, a, b are logical
bits, i.e. x, y ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by GW , the central entity
that controls (or initiates) the execution of the key agreement
protocol. Such a functionality is typically performed by the
central gateway in the network.
B. CAN Bus Physical Layer
CAN bus, the primary communication network for most
modern day cars, is a broadcast medium consisting of a series
of nodes connected via a twisted-pair cable with termination
impedance at either end. It has two logical states, the dominant
‘0’ state, where the bus is driven by a voltage, and the recessive
‘1’ state, where the bus is grounded. If two nodes transmit a
bit simultaneously, the effective state of the bus is dominant
‘0’ if any of the nodes transmits the dominant bit. Thus, the
bus acts as a logical AND gate between inputs from the nodes.
The CAN bus utilizes differential signaling to transmit the
data. In the CAN standard, when transmitting the dominant bit
0 on the bus, the output pins of the nodes, CANH and CANL,
are driven to different voltage levels, and the difference from
CANH to CANL is the output of the CAN bus. Similarly,
transmission of a recessive bit 1 occurs when CANH and
CANL are not driven, and will have similar voltage levels.
C. System Model
As this work focuses on attacking the PnS-CAN protocol,
it inherits the system requirements for successfully building
that system, as enumerated in [12]. We expect the typical
automotive network (CAN) to be comprised of heterogeneous
nodes, i.e. nodes from different manufacturers or families.
Since the PnS-CAN protocols are based on simultaneous
transmission by two nodes, all write operations on the bus
during the key agreement phase use ECU pairs. Thus, the
Node 1 Node 2
Adversary
CANH
CANL
5V 3.3V
Node 3
5V
Fig. 1: Representation of a typical CAN bus with 3 nodes and
an eavesdropping adversary
ECUs require modified CAN controllers that allow simultane-
ous transmission of data during this phase. However, during
regular operation, the network operates in a CAN-compliant
manner, and hence has only single node transmitting during a
frame.
D. Adversarial Model
We consider an arbitrarily powerful adversary that is capable
of observing the variation of CAN bus signals with high
voltage precision and timing resolution. Such an adversary
can be simply realized by an eavesdropper who accesses the
wires directly using a high precision oscilloscope. An alternate
means could be through a regular ECU connected to the CAN
bus with a high precision analog-to-digital (A/D) converter at
the input and a modified CAN controller capable of sampling
the bus at a high frequency. In a car, such nodes can be
connected to the OBD-II diagnostics port. A representation
of the CAN bus with adversarial presence is illustrated in Fig.
1.
The goal of this work is to demonstrate the existence of side-
channels. Even though such powerful adversaries are capable
of actively injecting or modifying signals, we consider the
adversarial behavior to be restricted to passive observations.
However, we assume that the adversary is capable of observing
the system for an arbitrarily long time. During regular system
operation, we assume that the adversary is capable triggering
the ECU of its choice to transmit. However, we assume that
such selective modifications cannot be made during execution
of the PnS-CAN protocol. Further, we assume that the adver-
sary cannot control the content of the transmissions.
For this paper, we limit the adversarial access to a single
point on the network. It should be noted that multiple points
of observation can undoubtedly increase the leakage. However,
since in an unmodified system, a single adversary is sufficient
for complete compromise, we leave the consideration of mul-
tiple probes to future analysis. For our attacks, we assume the
location of the adversary to be carefully selected and fixed.
An adversary can theoretically improve its observations by
adaptively changing its observation point.
E. Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup utilizes an FPGA (Altera Cyclone-
V) based implementation of PnS-TwoParty scheme described
in Protocol 1, implemented into a modified CAN controller.
The modified controller generates fully compliant CAN2.0
frames that can be accepted by any traditional CAN controller.
The test network consists of 16 nodes, using custom designed
transceiver boards that utilize the FPGA digital outputs, con-
nected via the standard CAN twisted pair cable.
The typical CAN architecture, consists of several subnet-
works of ECUs connected by one or more powerful nodes
that act as gateway nodes (GW ). However, for our system,
the nodes are connected in a single chain with the GW at one
end. This setup closely emulates one subnet of the network
found in most modern cars. We use a commercial USB-CAN
module to monitor the bus traffic. We use an Agilent 6012A
oscilloscope to probe the bus and record the samples for offline
processing.
F. PnS-CAN Scheme
The PnS-CAN scheme described in [11], [12], enables key
agreement between multiple nodes connected to the CAN bus.
For completeness, here we present a brief overview of the
fundamental operations of the two-party and linear group-
key schemes from [12]. We include specific implementation
aspects, that aid our attacks, in the protocol definition. For
detailed discussion about the security aspects of the original
scheme, the reader is referred to [12].
The PnS-CAN scheme between two nodes utilizes the wired
AND property of the CAN bus to mask the bits simultaneously
transmitted by the nodes. The security of this scheme is based
on the inability of an eavesdropper to differentiate between
transmissions that result in the same logical output on the bus,
i.e. combinations that result in the dominant (0) output.
The operation of the basic two party protocol between
nodeN1 and nodeN2, using random seeds r1, r2 is illustrated
as Protocol 1. In this, a secret bit is generated between nodeN1
and nodeN2 when one of the nodes transmits a logical 0
(dominant bit) while the other transmits a logical 1 (recessive
bit). Note that an ideal adversary is unable to identify which
of the two nodes, nodeN1 or nodeN2 transmitted the dominant
bit. The group key scheme described in [12] utilizes the
PnS-TwoParty protocol between successive nodes to form
a PnS chain. It was demonstrated that pairwise interactions
between consecutive ECUs are sufficient to share the key
with the group. Consider a group GK = {N1, N2, . . . , NK}
of K nodes. The group key scheme can be described as
Protocol 2: GroupKey-Linear:
1) The group communication order GK =
{N1, N2, . . . , NK} is broadcast to all participants
by the central gateway (GW ).
2) First, nodeN1 performs PnS-TwoParty with nodeN2 to
establish a key k12.
Protocol 1: PnS-TwoParty(nodeN1, nodeN2, r1, r2)
1) nodeN1 generates a sequence of psueodrandom bits, s1
using seed r1. The sequence is split into chunks (c1(i))
of half the size of the maximum CAN 2.0 payload. i.e.
s1 = {c1(1)||c1(2)|| . . .}. Similarly, nodeN2 generates a
sequence of psueodrandom bits, s2 = {c2(1)||c2(2)|| . . .},
using seed r2.
2) The bits in each chunk are interleaved with their com-
plements to produce packets of size equal to the maximum
payload, namely {p1(1), p1(2), . . .} and {p2(1), p2(2), . . .}.
Note for interleaving, each 0 bit is replaced by 01 and 1 is
replaced by 10.
3) nodeN1 initiates the transmission by using a dedicated
PnS-CAN header and p1(1) as payload. nodeN2 synchro-
nizes to the header and simultaneously transmits packet
p2(1) during the payload phase. For compliance with
regular CAN frames, each node dynamically performs bit
stuffing and CRC computation based on the bus outputs.
4) nodeN1 and nodeN2 sample the first logical bus output
sequence as b(1). The bits are de-interleaved to identify
the the result of the original and complement transmission.
Location within the transmitted chunk, where both the non-
inverted and inverted bits produced a 0 in the bus output,
are secret from an ideal eavesdropper. These are considered
as secret bits and the remaining bits are discarded.
5) The resulting sequence at nodeN1(remaining bits in the
chunk) are always inverse of the sequence at nodeN1. Thus
nodeN2 inverts its sequence to obtain a sequence of secret
bits identical to nodeN1. The process is repeated from 3
until the desired number of secret bits are generated.
Protocol 1: Practical two-party PnS protocol
3) Then nodeN2 utilizes the result k12 as the seed to generate
its random sequences and performs PnS-TwoParty with
nodeN3.
4) The process continues till nodeNK is reached. The final
key is the group key shared between all nodes.
It can be observed, that the security of the group key
protocol depends on the security of the pairwise PnS-TwoParty
scheme. We note that in systems, where the adversaries only
have high-level (software) access to the nodes, they can only
observe the logical output of the bus as determined by a
single (or three) transceiver samples. Thus, though perfect
obfuscation of the bit values in PnS-TwoParty is theoretically
possible, it cannot be guaranteed for most practical systems
where the adversaries may observe multiple high-resolution
bus samples.
III. ATTACKS ON PNS-CAN
To illustrate the properties that can be exploited to mount
a successful attack, consider the PnS-TwoParty system. As
described in Section II-F, a secret bit results when one of the
nodes transmits the dominant bit 0, i.e. drives the bus, and
the other node transmits the recessive bit 1, i.e. performs no
action. Even though, in the PnS-CAN system, nodes transmit
messages as full frames, for each bit of significance (secret
bit), only a single node is driving the bus. Thus identification
of the transmitting node effectively leaks the bit, as the bit is
0 if the driving node is primary participant and 1 otherwise.
For example, consider a PnS interaction between nodeN1
and nodeN2 using the random sequences {0, 1, 1, 0} and
{1, 0, 0, 1} respectively. This results in 4 shared secret bits,
i.e. key = 0110. The bit observations on the bus corresponding
to these would comprise of 8 bits (random bits interleaved
with the complement). {(b1, b2), . . . , (b7, b8), bi = 0. Here, b1
results from nodeN1 transmitting a dominant bit and nodeN2
a recessive bit. Thus if the adversary can identify nodeN1 as
the active node during b1, it can learn that the first secret bit
is 0. Next, we describe the phenomenon that can be used to
differentiate between various transmitters based on physical
properties of the CAN bus.
A. Physical Characteristics
Similar to other electrical systems, in an automotive
network will have differences in characteristics of the driver
and network between an observer and the transmitters. We
illustrate 3 phenomena that can be utilized to differentiate
between bits transmitted by different nodes.
Steady state characteristics - One of the advantages of using
differential signaling for CAN transmissions, is that it enables
devices with varying electrical characteristics to be utilized on
the same bus without any additional compensation circuitry.
While this improves the design and robustness of the bus,
the different characteristics also enables= identification of the
transmitter, leading to leakage of the bits. For a transmitted
bit, differences in steady state characteristics can be attributed
to several factors,
1) Difference in driver circuits - Transceivers from different
manufacturers (or even different models of the same manu-
facturer) can have different drive characteristics and output
voltage range of the CANH and CANL pins. This can be
due to different circuits, components or load impedance. Thus
an adversary measuring the absolute voltage on CANH and
CANL lines with respect to a common ground reference
can distinguish between the dominant transmissions from
different nodes.
For example, consider a realization of the network in
Fig. 1 using Microchip (MCP2551) for nodeN1 and NXP
(TJA1040) for nodeN2. The ideal specified range for the
CANH pin for MCP2551 is between 2.75V and 4.5V ,
while the same range for TJA1040 is between 3V and
4.25V . In Fig. 2a, we illustrate the voltage observations
of the adversary for a sequence of bits corresponding to
the generation of a secret bit in the PnS-CAN protocol,
i.e. transition from a 0 − 1 scenario to a 1 − 0 scenario.
The adversary can clearly distinguish between the dominant
transmission by nodeN1 and nodeN2.
(a) Observations for scenario of 2 nodes, A:MCP2551, B:TJA1040 (b) Observations of two identical transmitters located at different
distances from the adversary
Fig. 2: Steady state characteristics
2) Different operating voltages - The differential signaling of
the CAN bus allows interoperability of nodes with different
supply voltage, without scaling circuits. For example, typical
automotive networks contain ECUs with both 5V and
3.3V operating voltage. Though these nodes have similar
differential voltage between the CANH and CANL lines, the
absolute voltage level on each line, during bit transmission,
is different. An adversary can utilize this identify the node
transmitting the dominant bit during PnS-CAN.
3) Different physical locations - Even nodes with identical
drivers and operating voltages can seem different from the
view of an intermediate observer in the network. This is due
to the differences in the effective impedance of the network
segment between the two transceivers and the observer point.
For a typical CAN bus scenario, several factors can contribute
to these differences, e.g. different length of wires between the
nodes and the observer, or different number of intermediate
nodes. In Fig. 2b, we illustrate the differential voltage of
two nodes at varying distances (over 1m difference) from the
observer. In a typical CAN network, the difference in distance
can be over 30mThough this difference appears small in
comparison to other phenomenon, it can be useful in many
scenarios
Transient characteristics - The CAN physical medium has a
non-negligible capacitance and inductance that influences the
signal as it propagates. This influence, for signals transmit-
ted by different nodes, is in general non-uniform. Coupled
with inductive-loading of different intermediate transceivers
between an observer and the nodes, these influences can have
observable impact on the signals. Thus, as the state of a
node transitions from recessive to dominant (or vice versa),
it exhibits different transient characteristics. The sample point
of a typical bit is sufficiently delayed to ensure that the CAN
bus is robust from such transient fluctuations. However, an
adversary observing with a higher resolution can use these
differences to identify the transmitter.
One of the benefits of transient characteristics is that they
can vary widely even for similar nodes placed symmetrically
with respect to an observer. As illustrated in Fig. 3a,
observations by an adversary that is symmetrically placed in
Fig. 1 relative to two identical transmitters can be clearly
distinguished, based on time domain characteristics. However,
a disadvantage of the transient characteristics is that they
cannot be compared directly, and the performance is highly
dependent on the features that are derived for identification.
Several such features have been enumerated in [18].
Timing characteristics - The typical propagation delay for
the twisted pair cable used as the physical medium for the
CAN bus is 5ns/m. Thus for a traditional network of length
upto 50m, the difference in the time the transmitter drives (or
releases) the bus and an observer observes a signal transition
can be up to 250ns. Though such delays are accommodated
within the CAN bit timing specification for correct sampling
of the bit value, they can be exploited by an adversary to
identify the transmitter of a bit.
The relative bit timing observed by an adversary for two
transmitters can be influenced by two factors, namely the
difference in propagation delay between the observer and
the transmitters and the synchronization offset between the
transmitters. In Fig. 3b, we illustrate the observations of an
adversary that is symmetrically placed relative to two identical
transmitters. However, as it can be seen, even a propagation
difference of 0.02% of the bit timing is sufficient to distinguish
between the dominant transmission from the left node and the
right node, i.e. the scenario of secret bit generation, 1 − 0
followed by 0− 1 transmission in PnS-CAN.
(a) Observations of transients by an adversary, centrally located
between two identical transmitters
(b) Timing observations of an adversary centrally located between
two transmitters
Fig. 3: Transient and timing characteristics
B. Generalized Attack Model
Each PnS interaction occurs between two nodes in the
network. As discussed earlier, the attack on the PnS-CAN
system simply reduces to identification of the transmitting
node for each individual bit of the frame. Since there are just
two nodes in each PnS-CAN round, the adversary simply
needs to distinguish between the signals transmitted from the
two nodes (binary hypothesis testing). Here, we present a
general outline of the attack methodology that the an attacker
may follow.
(Data Collection) The adversary can observe the signal
transmission on the bus for a long duration prior to the attack.
Note that the any CAN-compatible node can synchronize
to the transmitter and identify and sample individual bits
in a transmitted frame. Consider that the adversary samples
each bit k times. We denote these bit observations by
T = {x−∞, . . . ,x0}, where xi ∈ Xk = Rk is a vector of
samples of the bit from the bus. We assume that the system
has M ECUs connected to the bus. Thus the observations
xi correspond to transmissions from any of the M ECUs
over a period of time. For traditional CAN networks, such
data is not labeled as the packets do not contain identifying
information. However, an adversary can generate labels for
the data by activating known ECUs and observing their output.
(Classifier Training) An adversary trains classification func-
tions, DNi,Nj : Xnk → {0, 0¯}n, for each pair of labels Ni, Nj ,
that estimate the the sequence of transmitters based on the
input observations. We note that using {0, 0¯} represents the
process of differentiating between the transmitters, rather than
identification. This represents a larger class of classifiers,
as any classifier that can correctly assign the labels, can
also differentiate between the transmitters. The adversary can
train the classification functions directly from T , using a
variety of supervised or unsupervised techniques, e.g. binary
support vector machines (SVM), LSTM, Convolutional Neural
Networks [21].
For scenarios where the node does not have knowledge
cannot acquire knowledge of the participating nodes or
where the training data is unlabeled, the node may train a
generalized decision function D0,0¯ : Xnk → {0, 0¯}n, that uses
a classification function preceded by a selection approach
(such as maximum likelihood based estimator) select the best
function. Clearly, the performance of a generalized classifier
is sub optimal compared to the classifier for a particular pair
of nodes. Thus an adversary, without apriori knowledge of
the transmitters has a significant disadvantage.
(PnS-CAN compromise) During PnS-CAN operation, for an
adversary to extract the key, it does not require perfect identifi-
cation of the node identity. Since the PnS system involves just
two ECUs at any time, its task is to simply distinguish between
the transmissions from the two participating ECUs. Consider
the scenario where two nodes Ni, Nj execute the PnS protocol
to produce n bits. The adversary observes the k sample values
for each of the n bits as xi = {s1(i), s2(i), . . . , sk(i)}, 1 ≤
i ≤ n and uses the classifier DNi,Nj (or general classifier in
scenarios where Ni, Nj is unknown) and obtains a sequence
of estimates (Tˆ1, Tˆ2, . . . , Tˆn) ∈ {0, 0¯}n.
For PnS-CAN, classification without correct labeling of the
nodes still reveals the complete secret (or its inverse). Thus
the disadvantage of the weaker adversary is simply 1 bit of
entropy, which is insignificant and results in violation of sys-
tem security. We note that methods from CAN identification
literature, e.g. from [18]–[20], [22], can be directly mapped
to this generalized outline to attack the PnS-CAN scheme.
However, the accuracy may be lower since the identification
is for a single bit rather than a group of bits (frame).
C. Timing Based Attack Evaluation
We demonstrate an attack on the PnS-CAN scheme using
the timing characteristics described in Section III-A. Our
choice of the timing parameter is governed by several factors
1) Timing represents a phenomenon that is independent
of the node characteristics. In fact, it depends only on
synchronization and propagation aspects. Thus it can be
applied to all networks.
2) Timing attacks demonstrate the vulnerability of the un-
protected system against a very simple adversary.
3) The timing component represents a feature that has not
been specifically evaluated in [22]. Other features from
[22] can be directly applied to attack PnS-CAN via our
framework described in Section III-B.
We utilize the oscilloscope to obtain samples of the differen-
tial bus voltage at 125Msamp/s. The transitions are identified
by as points of large change in bus voltage (greater than the
CAN trigger) followed by a steady state over atleast half the
bit width. We utilize the 50% point of the transition to compute
the rise time, fall time and latency.
First, we investigate the separability of the nodes by measur-
ing the propagation delays of the nodes synced with respect to
the observation point. In Table I, we enumerate the propagation
delays from each node. Intuitively, nodes that have similar
propagation delay would be difficult to differentiate (in the
perfectly synchronized scenario). Further, in Table II, we enu-
merate combinations of nodes have the least (and maximum)
overlap. Such nodes pairs correspond to the nodes with the
largest (and smallest) adversarial advantage.
In Fig 4, we illustrate a snapshot of the CAN protocol
between two nodes as observed by an adversary. Intuitively,
the attack exploits the difference in propagation delays by
synchronizing to one of the transceivers and estimating the
transmitter based on the rise and fall time offset. There are
two key features of the PnS-CAN implementation that aid our
analysis.
1) The initiating node transmits the PnS header and the
secondary node synchronizes to the initiating node. Since
only a single node is transmitting during the header
phase, it is easy to estimate the timing variation for the
synchronous bits.
2) As described in Section II-F, the random bits are inter-
leaved with the inverted bits. This introduces dependence
in successive transmissions as it enables only certain
transitions during the PnS phase. This can be utilized
to estimate the bits in some cases.
The detailed attack is be described as Attack PnS-TwoParty.
We utilized this to identify the secret key for 12 pairs of
nodes in our setup. With minor modification of the threshold
parameters between different iterations, we were able to
successfully identify all the secret bits exchanged between
each pair.
Attack: PnS-TwoParty
1) The adversary synchronizes to the first 1 to 0 transition,
i.e. start of frame bit (SOF). The transmitting node is the
referred to as the primary node.
2) The adversary utilizes the first 19 bits of the header to
estimate the expected variation parameters of transition
times (µp, σp).
Start of the PnS data frame
3) If the bit value has changed, compute the transition time.
Compute the bit triggering the transition by comparing the
transition time to a threshold τ , where τ is a function of
(µp, σp).
4) If bit value has not changed,
a) If this is corresponding to the first bit (non-inverted),
then the possible transitions are 0− 0→ 0− 1, 0− 1→
1−0, 0−0→ 1−0, and vice versa. If the current voltage
level is higher than the previous bit ((b) in Fig. 4), both
nodes transmitted a dominant value for the current bit.
Otherwise, if the level decreases, nodes transitioned to
a 0 − 1 or 1 − 0 configuration. Utilize the next bit to
compute the current value.
b) If this is corresponding to the second bit, it could have
only resulted from a 0 − 1 → 1 − 0 transition or vice
versa. If a dip is detected at the start of the frame ((a) in
Fig. 4), the primary node was transmitting a dominant
bit in the previous frame. Otherwise, if an increase is
detected ((c) in 4), the secondary node was transmitting
the 0.
Soft synchronization
5) If the secondary node ever triggers a recessive to dominant
transition, resync to the secondary node and switch the
roles of the primary and secondary nodes. This is depicted
by (r) in Fig. 4.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES FOR PNS-CAN
As discused, the PnS-CAN module is susceptible to a range
of characterization attacks due to consistency of the features
of the physical signals from individual nodes. While this is
good for robustness of the system, the CAN standard allows
for significant variation of these properties. Thus, intuitively,
we design the countermeasures to add controlled noise to
the physical signals, such that signals from different nodes
are indistinguishable for an adversary. The goal of the noise
addition is to minimize the adversarial advantage between
nodes.
Here, we propose mitigations at different levels of abstrac-
tions, namely the transceiver hardware level, CAN controller
level and the system level. At the hardware and controller
level, the goal is to minimize the adversarial advantage be-
tween all ECUs either by adding noise or improving coop-
eration between the nodes. At the system level, the goal is
to minimize adversarial advantage by restricting interaction
between highly identifiable nodes. It should be noted that the
performance of the countermeasures proposed here is highly
dependent on the CAN properties. Thus, they are proposed
with the goal of minimizing the leakage, rather than provably
eliminating it. We leave as an open problem, the design
Node Delay (ns) Node Delay (ns)
ID Min Max Mean Std ID Min Max Mean Std
1 138 166 151.8 12.6 9 118 154 135.2 15.7
2 140 168 153.4 12.5 10 118 154 135.0 15.3
3 140 168 153.8 12.6 11 122 156 139.1 14.7
4 140 172 156.2 12.9 12 124 158 140.9 14.6
5 130 162 144.4 14.2 13 116 146 130.6 12.6
6 130 160 144.8 14.0 14 118 146 131.2 12.3
7 132 164 147.1 13.7 15 118 152 135.4 14.8
8 136 164 148.7 12.4 16 122 154 137.2 13.3
TABLE I: Signal delays between nodes and observer
Interval overlap N1 N2
6.00 2 13
6.00 2 14
6.00 3 13
32.00 11 12
34.00 9 15
34.00 10 15
36.00 9 10
TABLE II: Maximum and minimum
overlaps
Fig. 4: Snapshot of bus observations for PnS protocol
of countermeasures that can formally shown to be effective
against the adversaries treated here.
A. Activating Multiple ECUs
The voltage observed by an adversary is a function of
strength of the current source and impedance of the network
between the observer and the current source. For a non-
uniform network, this directly relates to the physical positions
of source and the observer. To prevent identification by the
adversary, voltage can be varied for each transmission of the
dominant bit by using a random number of current sources,
located at different points in the network.
Our experimental results demonstrate that the observa-
tions at a single point due to dominant bits from multiple
transceivers is different. Such a phenomenon can also be
observed in box (c) of Fig 4. In Table III, we enumerate the
output at the observer due to simultaneous transmissions from
different transceivers connected to the bus. For increased vari-
ations, we performed experiments using 3 different transceiver
families, i.e. nodeN1 (MCP2551), nodeN2 (TJA1040) and
nodeN3 (TJA1041).
Similar to variation in sources, adding a random number
of sink nodes may vary the observation by an adversary.
In the regular setting, each node on the bus that is not
transmitting acts as a sink. Thus, we can vary the number
of sinks on the bus by adding the capability of electrical
isolation of non-participating nodes. Thus any transceiver
with such a capability can be in 3 distinct modes, i.e.
transmitting a dominant signal, transmitting a recessive bit
(or just passive), or electrically isolated. In Table IV, we
outline the voltage observations of the adversary for different
states of the tri-state nodes. The ‘X ′ denotes a transceiver
that is electrically isolated. Ideally, with N transceivers, we
can obtain 3N − 2N different voltage levels. The variation of
voltage levels with a bit can decrease the probability of its
identification. We outline a few architectures to utilize this
feature to prevent adversarial information leakage.
(Hardware level) Multiple transceivers per controller - The
simplest method to vary the number of active transceivers
is by equipping each node with multiple transceivers. For
each dominant transmission, the transciver can select any
combination of transceiver states to transmit the bit. Similarly
for recessive bit transmission, the transceivers can be toggled
between the isolated and receiving mode. If each controller
is equipped with N transceivers with isolation capability, the
node can output upto 3N −2N voltage levels for the dominant
transmission and 2N − 1 levels for recessive bit transmission.
Thus, for each PnS transmission that is usable as a secret, i.e.
one of the nodes transmitting a dominant bit and the other
transmitting a recessive bit, the system can cycle between
TABLE III: Vout for dominant tx by multiple nodes
nodeN1 nodeN2 nodeN3 Vout
0 0 0 2.4230
0 0 1 2.1281
0 1 0 2.1197
0 1 1 1.8208
1 0 0 2.3400
1 0 1 1.7710
1 1 0 1.7629
1 1 1 0.0000
TABLE IV: Vout for dominant tx by multiple nodes with
isolation
nodeN1 nodeN2 nodeN3 Vo
X 0 0 2.5842
X 0 1 2.1174
X 1 0 2.0923
0 0 X 2.3159
0 1 X 1.9647
1 0 X 2.1493
0 X 0 2.2957
0 X 1 1.9599
1 X 0 2.1415
(3N − 2N )(2N − 1) voltage levels. Thus, even a system with
2 transceivers per controller, the adversary would observe 15
different voltage levels for each transmission from the node
pair.
Though this countermeasure incurs additional cost, one of
the advantages of hardware level countermeasures is that they
can be implemented independent of the controller. Thus, the
frequency of switching between different transceiver states
can be higher than the bit rate, effectively causing several
noisy variations over the bit period.
(Controller level) Passive cooperation - A lower cost
alternative to adding new transceivers is by enabling the nodes
connected to the network to cooperate with the transmitting
nodes during the PnS-CAN protocol. Each node that does
not need to observe signals on the CAN bus can at random
time instances, isolate its transceiver (i.e. the ‘X’ state).
Note, that since this done only during the PnS-CAN data
transmission phase, it does not violate the CAN requirement
of nodes listening for critical frames. For nodes with multiple
transceivers, this can be implemented without the controller
signals, if one of the transceivers always stays connected.
(Controller level) Active cooperation - A node typically
monitors the CAN bus by sampling the bus at a high
frequency. If it detects a transition from recessive to the
dominant state, it can choose to (based on a random choice)
actively assist the transmitter by randomly transitioning
between the idle and dominant state for the remainder of the
bit duration.
(System level) Active cooperation - If the PnS-CAN protocol
is executed between a group of nodes, as described in Section
II-F, all nodes in the chain that precede the currently active
nodes are aware of the expected transmissions by one of the
participants. Thus, active cooperation may be provided by
such nodes during the expected dominant bit transmission,
by synchronously transmitting a 0. For systems that utilize
cooperation at this level, the adversarial advantage between
nodes becomes a function of their position within the chain.
Thus, the adversarial advantage between a pair of nodes
decreases as their position moves further down the chain.
Node 1
CAN Bus
Node 2
Adversary
t12
t2a
t1a
tra tr1 tr2
Reference
Region R1 Region R2 Region R3
Fig. 5: Different timing and region parameters of the CAN
bus for timing analysis
B. (Controller Level) Addition of timing jitter
As demonstrated by the attack mechanism in Section III-C,
since the nodes synchronize at the beginning of each frame,
the transitions for a bit occur within a well defined and distinct
time interval, leading to easy classification. Thus, addition of
random jitter to each dominant bit transmitted can decrease the
probability of identification by the adversary. To achieve this,
for each node, nodeNi, we introduce a jitter interval (tlNi , t
h
Ni
),
over which the node uniformly adjust its bit start time and
correspondingly adjusts the bit duration. The variation of the
intervals allows a system designer to minimize the leakage
within the jitter tolerance bounds of the system.
In Fig. 5, we illustrate the different system parameters that
govern the leakage to an adversary for 2 nodes. We define
propagation delay from nodeNi to the adversary is tia, i =
1, 2, and the propagation delay from nodeN1 to nodeN2 as
t12. Assuming that the nodes are synchronized to a common
reference point r, we represent by tra, tr1, tr2 the offset of
the nominal bit start time relative to the common reference.
Further, we consider t2p to represent the processing time of
the bus signal through the circuit of nodeN2. If the adversary
observes transitions from nodeN1 and nodeN2, the difference
in the observation times of the both the transitions, tˆ12, can
be expressed as
tˆ12 = (tr2 + t
2
a + +t
2
p)− (tr1 + t1a)
= (tr2 − tr1) + (t2a − t1a) + +t2p
= (offset between nodes) + (diff. in prop. delay)
+ (proc time).
Here, tˆ12 determines the ability of the adversary to differen-
tiate between the two transmitters. Based on the location of the
adversary, the delay varies from 2t12 +t2p in region R1 to t
2
p in
region R3. If the nodes utilized the jitter-intervals to determine
the start times of the bits, the adversary would observe the bit
transition times as samples from the two distributions, over
the support sets I1 = (tl1, t
h
1 ), I2 = (t
l
2 + tˆ12, t
h
2 + tˆ12), for
each node nodeN1, nodeN2 respectively. The leakage to the
adversary is determined by its ability to distinguish between a
sample from I1 and I2. Thus the goal of the system designer
is to increase the overlap between the two intervals. The nodes
minimize the offset as follows,
1) Prior to PnS-CAN, each node estimates the propagation
delay to the communicating node based on a recessive to
dominant transition from the other node.
2) The nodes disable soft re-synchronization during the
CAN frame transmission. The secondary node nodeN2
keeps itself synchronized to the primary node nodeN1
for the duration of the PnS execution.
3) The nodes select a parameter α based on the propagation
delay and maximum permissible jitter.
4) The nodes set the jitter intervals as (tl1, t
h
1 ) = (0, αt12)
and (tl2, t
h
2 ) = (−αt12, 0). The start time of the bit is
picked uniformly from the interval.
For practical scenarios, the intervals I1 and I2 cannot be
defined to overlap completely. Thus, it is not possible to
completely eliminate leakage to the adversary. However, by
increasing the overlap, we decrease the adversarial advantage.
C. System Level - Tree-Based Group Key Scheme
It is clear that the leakage between different pairs of
nodes, varies significantly. An alternative mechanism to
reduce adversarial leakage would be to prevent (or minimize)
interaction between highly susceptible nodes. Consider the
scenario of establishing a key between a group of nodes using
the GroupKey-Linear protocol in Section II-F. Intuitively,
the order of the node communication can be modified to
prevent leakage prone nodes from communicating. First we
consider the following modification to the GroupKey-Linear,
for organization of the nodes in a tree-like structure.
GroupKey-Tree:
1) The group communication order GK =
{N1, N2, . . . , Nk} is broadcast to all participants
by the gateway (GW ).
2) First, N1 performs PnS with N2 to establish a key.
Then N2 utilizes the result to perform PnS with any
Ni, i ≤ 2 and updates the key. Proceeding forward, Nj
will performs PnS with any ni, i < j.
3) The process continues till nk is reached and the group
key is generated.
Functionally, the GroupKey-Tree protocol is equivalent to
GroupKey-Linear. The GroupKey-Tree scheme presented here
should not be confused with the tree-based scheme presented
by the original authors in [12], as that utilizes a binary
balanced tree. We have no such constraints here. It should
be noted that for both GroupKey-Tree and GroupKey-Linear,
the number of interactions between the nodes are the same.
Thus GroupKey-Tree introduces no additional communication
overhead.
Successive interactions leak information to an adversary,
and such leakage is dependent upon the participants. Thus
intuitively, the each node in GK , instead of communicating
with a fixed single node, can select the node from a
pool that minimizes adversarial leakage. We utilize the
adversarial advantage described in Section III-B to establish a
leakage-aware node order for group key generation as follows,
1. Mapping - First, the GW maps the network and
the adversarial advantage between all pairs of nodes
{1, 2, . . . ,M}. The adversarial advantage can be represented
as weights of the edges of a fully connected graph KM ,
where the ECUs represent the vertices. Thus, the GW
learns the weighted graph. This can be performed by several
methods, i.e determined offline during system installation and
programmed into the GW , or using observing network data
to dynamically determine classification functions to compute
the adversarial advantage.
2. Ordering - For any given group GK , the GW , using
the graph obtained during mapping, reorders the nodes such
that the overall leakage is minimized. For the GroupKey-Tree
scheme, the node order takes the form of a tree. The criteria
of minimization can be varied based on the countermeasures
for pairwise PnS and adversarial restrictions.
We define by KM [GK ], the subgraph induced in KM by
GK . Thus, for key generation using GroupKey-Tree, the pro-
cess of defining the node order using KM [GK ] is tantamount
to finding the minimum spanning tree over the graph. Define T
as the set of all possible spanning trees of the graph KM [GK ].
We define the node ordering problem as finding T ∗ ∈ T that
solves,
min
T∈T
max
(i,j)∈T
di,j , (1)
where (i, j) is the edge in the tree and di,j is the adversarial
advantage for nodes i and j. This minimizes the maximum
cost path in the tree. For a group key scheme over the tree,
leakage at any step would leak the entire key. Intuitively, we
want to ensure that the weakest path in the scheme does not
leak sufficient information to the adversary. Computationally,
this requires the adversary to compute the min-max spanning
tree over KM [GK ]. Since every minimum spanning tree is
also a min-max spanning tree, the solutions that minimize
total leakage also minimize the max-link leakage. Thus it
is both computationally and performance optimal to simply
compute the minimum spanning tree over the subgraph.
Several well known algorithms are present in literature for
such optimization, e.g. Prim’s algorithm [23], Kruskal’s
algorithm [24].
3. Rank assignment - Once the order of communication has
been determined by the GW , can be communicated to the
members of the group. As discussed in Section III-B, the lack
of knowledge about the node order would force the adversary
to use a generic classification function D0,0¯, thus effectively
decreasing the adversarial advantage. Thus, the GW can use
‘privacy preserving’ methods to distribute the node order.
This can be achieved by several mechanisms based on the
adversarial assumptions and pre-shared knowledge between
the GW and the nodes.
As an example, consider a system using the authenticated
variant of the PnS-CAN scheme, [12]. Here, the GW shares
a secret (cryptographic key) with each node. Thus a node
can utilize this key to mask the identity of each node, and
hence the overall order of the nodes. Consider f(·, ·) to be a
cryptographic pseudorandom function (PRF). Thus, the order
of the group {NO1 , . . . , NOK} may be communicated as
r||f(kNO1 , r)||f(kNO2 , r)|| . . . ||f(kNOK , r),
where r ← {0, 1}n represents a nonce.
V. DISCUSSION
The goal of the discussion in this paper is twofold. Firstly,
it demonstrates that even simple physical features can be
utilized to compromise the PnS-CAN scheme. Secondly it
illustrates simple techniques that can be utilized to modify the
physical characteristics and reduce the information leakage.
We emphasize that neither of these investigations is intended
to represent the comprehensive attack vectors or defense
mechanisms.
For example, given the robustness of the CAN protocol, one
can imagine that there are a series of fundamental component
variations that can be utilized to add noise to the characteristics
discussed here. Similarly, future results in classification and
learning theory can be utilized to improve the performance of
the adversary beyond what has been discussed here.
There are several open questions that remain with the
countermeasures discussed here. For example, there are funda-
mental trade-offs that can be investigated between the coun-
termeasures. As an example, addition sufficient jitter to the
bit timing for effectiveness, while maintaining robust sampling
between the farthest nodes may require operation of the system
at a lower speed. However, this improves the observability
of the adversary and significantly impacts transients (and any
associated countermeasures). Further, improved countermea-
sures can be developed by identifying correlations between
the adversarial advantage and physical features. While we
have studied certain empirical dependencies, a comprehensive
analysis can yield better insight into identification of dominant
physical characteristics that can be modified.
For our attacks and countermeasures, we utilized a simple
laboratory setup to emulate the CAN system. A real deploy-
ment of the system is subject to far more noisy conditions
and many subtle electrical effects, e.g. transmission line phe-
nomenon, that are not accurately in our setup. Thus even
though this work serves as a proof-of-concept, the investiga-
tion of these attacks and countermeasures can yield different
results in a real system, and warrants further investigation.
The countermeasures discussed here span several implan-
tation layers and components. While simple hardware and
controller changes can uniformly improve the system security
for all the nodes, they require changes to the CAN transceivers
or controllers, which may not be very desirable in a real
system. Further, for deployment of such systems in highly
regulated environments, such as automotive, the new changes
would have to be thoroughly tested to not impact the system
reliability. This can significantly increase the cost of imple-
menting such countermeasures.
On the other hand, system level changes can be easily
implemented, but have impact on leakage for limited scenarios.
In a practical system, the designer would deploy several
additional mechanisms in addition to the countermeasures
proposed here.
For example, there may be system level mechanisms that
limit the data gathering ability of an adversary. Since the per-
formance of the distinguishing functions used by an adversary
depends on the training data available to it, lack of data can
reduce the leakage. Similarly, the system designer may elec-
trically isolate common access mechanisms, such as the OBD-
II port to limit the observation of physical characteristics.
As discussed briefly, the lack of apriori knowledge about the
participants of the protocol can reduce adversary performance
by limiting the distinguishing functions that can be used. Such
masking techniques could be implemented by designer at a
system level in addition to the proposed countermeasures.
A. Conclusion
While the PnS-CAN scheme is a promising mechanism
for generating group keys, it is highly susceptible to probing
attacks by even simple adversaries. We presented a general
methodology for attacking the system and demonstrated a
simple timing based attack. We discussed several sources of
physical identifiers that can be used by an adversary. We
proposed several mechanisms to mask these identifiers at the
hardware, CAN controller and system level. This work serves
as a proof-of-concept for the existence of attacks on the PnS-
CAN schemes and the the ability of the system designer to
prevent them.
APPENDIX A
NODE DISTANCE
To characterize the difference in leakage between different
nodes, we define the adversarial advantage for interaction
between two nodes (Ni, Nj), as probability of successfully
distinguishing between them, i.e. identify the transmitting
node, based on the bus observations. For practical scenarios,
we can define the adversarial advantage based on the perfor-
mance of the trained classification functions defined in Section
III-B, applied to empirical data. We define by xNji , the samples
of transmissions of bit i from node Nj . Thus we define the
adversarial advantage for nodes (Ni, Nj) as,
dNi,Nj =
1
4
(
Pr
(
Di,j(xN11 , xN12 ) = (0, 0)
)
+ Pr
(
Di,j(xN11 , xN22 ) = (0, 0¯)
)
+ Pr
(
Di,j(xN21 , xN12 ) = (0, 0¯)
)
+ Pr
(
Di,j(xN21 , xN22 ) = (0, 0)
))
, (2)
where Pr denotes the probability over all random choices
made in the decision function.
In (2), we assume each sequence is equi-probable, which
is typically the case for the PnS-CAN protocol. For scenarios
where information about the participating node is not avail-
able, we define a generalized adversarial advantage dgi,j by
using the generalized decision function D0,0¯ in place of Di,j .
Clearly, dgi,j ≤ di,j for all nodes.
Such a notion of distance can be used to quantitatively
measure the impact of the countermeasures implemented by
the system designer. Alternatively, this can provide a numerical
measure of the adversarial strength for any optimization that
the designer may choose to perform.
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